Abstract. In this paper, we present efficient asynchronous protocols that allow to build proactive cryptosystems secure against a mobile fail-stop adversary. Such systems distribute the power of a public-key cryptosystem among a set of servers, so that the security and functionality of the overall system is preserved against an adversary that crashes and/or eavesdrops every server repeatedly and transiently, but no more than a certain fraction of the servers at a given time. The building blocks of proactive cryptosystems -to which we present novel solutions -are protocols for joint random secret sharing and for proactive secret sharing. The first protocol provides every server with a share of a random value unpredictable by the adversary, and the second allows to change the shared representation of a secret value. Synchronous protocols for these tasks are well-known, but the standard method for adapting them to the asynchronous model requires an asynchronous agreement sub-protocol. Our solutions are more efficient as they go without such an agreement sub-protocol. Moreover, they are the first solutions for such protocols having a bounded worst-case complexity, as opposed to only a bounded average-case complexity.
Introduction
Threshold cryptography addresses the task of distributing a cryptosystem among n servers such that the security and functionality of this distributed system is guaranteed even if an adversary corrupts up to t servers [2] (see [3] for a survey). Threshold cryptosystems are realized by sharing the key of the underlying cryptosystem among all servers using a (t + 1)-out-n sharing scheme [4] , and by accomplishing the cryptographic task through a distributed protocol. If this task involves the choice of secret random values, then the distribution of the task involves so-called joint random secret sharing (JRSS) [5] , which allow the servers to jointly generate a (t + 1)-out-n sharing of a random value unpredictable by the adversary.
Proactive cryptosystems use threshold cryptosystems as the basis, but drastically reduce the assumption concerning failures [6] (see [7] for a survey). They operate in a sequence of time periods called phases and tolerate a mobile adversary, which corrupts the servers transiently and repeatedly, and is only restricted to corrupt at most t servers during every phase. Technically, proactive cryptosystems are threshold cryptosystems function [13] . This allows the honest servers to reproduce the steps of a (possibly) faulty server in public, instead of agreeing on a set of such servers and then excluding them from the computation (as it is done by previous work). Related Work. As mentioned previously, Cachin et al. [9] implemented asynchronous proactive protocols using an agreement subprotocol as a building block, which results in a relatively high round complexity. Zhou [14] proposed to build proactive cryptosystems on a weaker notion of PSS, which can be implemented without agreement. In this weaker PSS protocol, every server computes in every phase a list of candidate shares such that one of these candidates is the fresh share of the secret. Zhou shows that this suffices to implement a proactive version of RSA signatures exploiting the fact that RSA signatures are unique in the sense that for any public key and any message, there exists only one signature on the given message valid under the given public key. Unfortunately, the approach of Zhou [14] cannot be applied to proactivize discrete-logarithm signature schemes such as ElGamal [15] or DSS [16] , as these schemes are not unique in the above sense. The only known technique for proactivizing these signature schemes are protocols for JRSS and for PSS in the sense we introduced them before. Organization. In the next section we introduce our system model, and recall the definitions of cryptographic tools we use in the proposed solutions. In Section 3 we give an overview of our constructions. Section 4 presents an efficient secret sharing protocol, which will be useful in our constructions. In Section 5 we present our solution for an asynchronous proactive pseudorandomness scheme. In Sections 6 and 7, we describe our solutions to asynchronous proactive secret sharing, and to asynchronous joint random secret sharing, respectively. In Section 8 we sketch how these protocols can be used to proactivize public-key signature schemes, considering Schnorr's signature scheme [17] as an example. Finally, in Section 9 we conclude the paper.
Asynchronous Proactive System Model
Motivation. Proactive cryptosystems are threshold cryptosystems that operate in a sequence of phases. At the beginning of every phase, the servers refresh the shares of the underlying threshold system such that the new shares are independent of the old shares (except for the fact that they define the same secret). This prevents an adversary from learning the shared key, assuming that she corrupts no more than t servers in every phase. Such an assumption can be justified if every phase lasts some limited amount of real time, the idea being that it takes the adversary a certain amount of real time to corrupt a server, and that corruptions are transient, i.e., do not last forever [6] .
This idea maps onto a synchronous network in a straightforward way: one can define phases with respect to a common clock accessible to every server and implement refresh using a synchronous protocol [8] . The drawback of this approach is that synchronous protocols proceed in rounds, i.e., messages are sent on a clock "tick", and are received at the next "tick". This may lead to slow protocols in practice, as the duration of a communication round must account for maximal message delays and maximal shifts among local clocks of the servers. Moreover, as the security of synchronous protocols relies on the timely delivery of messages, this approach is also vulnerable to timing attacks, which are often easy to launch.
Cachin et. al [9] suggest to avoid these issues by implementing refresh using an asynchronous protocol. Such protocols are message-driven, i.e., proceed as soon as messages arrive. This allows a server to terminate a refresh and proceed with the next phase as soon as it has received enough information. Moreover, such protocols do not rely on upper bounds on message delays or clock shifts, i.e., they are as fast as the network. Timing attacks will only slow down such protocols, but not affect their security.
However, in a purely asynchronous network servers would not have access to a common clock for defining phases. Therefore, Cachin et al. [9] suggest to define phases locally to every server in terms of a single time signal, or clock tick, that occurs locally for a server and only indicates the start of a phase. The idea is to model systems where the time signals come from a local clock, say every day at 0:00 UTC, and where the local clocks are loosely synchronized, say they agree on which day and hour it is. Hence, the model is partially synchronous with long stretches of asynchrony. Such a setting implies an upper bound on the real time available to an adversary for corrupting servers in a certain phase, which justifies the assumption that an adversary corrupts only t servers in the same local phase [6] .
The formal model of [9] does not further constrain the synchronization of phases, i.e., it leaves the scheduling of phases up to the adversary. This is to ensure that the security of a protocol does not rely on any synchrony assumptions, and hence, is not affected by timing attacks.
Network and Adversary. We adopt the basic system model from [9] , which is parameterized by a security parameter k; a function (k) is called negligible if for all c > 0 there exists a k 0 such that (k) < 1 k c for all k > k 0 . The network consists of n servers P 1 , . . . , P n and an adversary which are all probabilistic interactive Turing machines (PITM) [10] that run in polynomial time in k. The random tape of a server is initialized at the beginning of the computation, and we assume that the servers can erase information. There is also an initialization algorithm run by a trusted dealer before the system starts. On input k, n, t, and further parameters, it generates the state information used to initialize the servers.
Every server operates in a sequence of m(k) local phases, where m(k) is a polynomial. The phases are defined with respect to dedicated input actions of the form (in, clock tick), scheduled by the adversary. The local phase of a server is defined as the number of such input actions it has received. The servers are connected by a proactive secure asynchronous network that allows every pair of servers to communicate authentically and privately whenever they are in the same local phase. The scheduling of the communication is determined by the adversary. Formally, we model such a network as follows. There exists a global set of messages M, whose elements are identified by a label (s, r, l, τ ) denoting the sender s, the receiver r, the length l of the message, and the phase τ when the message has been sent. The adversary sees the labels of all messages in M, but not their contents. All communication is driven by the adversary, and proceeds in steps as follows. Initially, M is empty. At each step, the adversary performs some computation, chooses a server P i , and selects some message m ∈ M with label (s, i, l, τ ), where P i must be currently in local phase τ . The message m is then removed from M, and P i is activated with m on its communication input tape. When activated, P i reads the contents of its communication input tape, performs some computation, and generates one or more response messages, which it writes to its communication output tape. Then, the response messages are added to M, and control returns to the adversary. This step is repeated arbitrarily often until the adversary halts. We view this sequence of steps as logical time, and sometimes use the phrase "at a certain point in time" to refer to such a step. Such proactive secure asynchronous networks can be implemented based on a secure co-processor [18] , or on the assumption that the network itself is authentic during short periods of time, allowing the exchange of fresh communication keys [19] .
We assume an adaptive mobile fail-stop adversary. The adversary may corrupt a server P i at any point in time by activating it on a special input action. After such an event, she may read the entire internal state of P i , which includes its random tape but not previously erased information. Furthermore, she may observe all messages being received, until she leaves the server. During such a period of time, we call a server corrupted; at every other point in time, a server is called honest. The adversary may also cause a corrupted server to stop executing a protocol. We call an adversary t-limited if for any phase τ , she corrupts at most t servers that are in a local phase τ or τ + 1.
Protocol execution and notation. In our model, protocols are invoked by the adversary. Every protocol instance is identified by a unique string ID, which is chosen by the adversary when it invokes the instance. For a protocol instance ID, we model the specific input and output actions of a server in terms of messages of the form (ID, in, . . . ) and (ID, out, . . . ) that a server may receive and produce, respectively. Messages that servers send to each other over the network on behalf of an instance ID have the form (ID, type, . . . ), where type is defined by the protocol. We call a message associated with a protocol instance ID if it is of the form (ID, . . . ).
We describe a protocol in terms of transition rules that are executed in parallel. Such a transition rule consists of a condition on received messages and other state variables, and of a sequence of statements to be executed in case the condition is satisfied. We define parallel execution of transition rules as follows. When a server is activated and the condition of one or more transition rule is satisfied, one such rule is chosen arbitrarily and the corresponding statements are executed. This is repeated until no more conditions of transition rules are satisfied. Then, the activation of the server is terminated.
A protocol instance may also invoke another protocol instance by sending it a suitable input action and obtain its output via an output action. We assume that there is an appropriate server-internal mechanism which creates the instance for the sub-protocol, delivers the input message, and passes the produced output message to the calling protocol. Furthermore, we assume that upon termination of a protocol instance, all internal variables associated with this instance are erased.
Efficiency Measures and Termination. We define the message complexity of a protocol instance as the number of all associated messages produced by honest servers. It is a family of random variables that depend on the adversary and on k. Similarly, the communication complexity of a protocol instance is defined as the bit length of all associated messages, and is also a family of such random variables. To define the latency (round complexity) of a protocol, we follow the approach of [20] , where informally speaking the latency of an execution is the absolute duration of the execution divided by a longest message delay in this execution, where both times are as measured by an imaginary external clock. The latency of a protocol is a latency of a worst-case execution. (For details see the full version of [20] , page 6.)
These quantities define a protocol statistic X, i.e., a family of real-valued, nonnegative random variables {X A (k)}, parameterized by the adversary A and the security parameter k, where each X A (k) is a random variable induced by running the system with A. We call a protocol statistic uniformly bounded if there exists a fixed polynomial p(k) such that for all adversaries A, the probability Pr[X A (k) > p(k)] is negligible.
As usual in asynchronous networks, we require liveness of a protocol, i.e., that "something good" eventually happens, only to the extent that the adversary delivers in every phase all associated messages among the servers that remain honest during this phase. As in [21] , we define termination as the combination of liveness and an efficiency condition, which requires a protocol to have uniformly bounded message complexity, i.e., the number of messages produced by the protocol is independent of the adversary.
Cryptographic Assumptions. Our constructions are based on the assumption that there exists pseudo-random functions [13] defined as follows (sketch): Let F k denote the set of functions from {0, 1} k → {0, 1} k , and let e ∈ R Dom denote the process of choosing an element e uniformly at random from domain Dom. Finally, let D f denote the execution of an algorithm D when given oracle access to f , where f is a random variable over F k . We say that D with oracle access distinguishes between two random variables ψ and g over F k with gap
is negligible, the collection {Ψ k } k∈N is called pseudorandom. We consider pseudorandom collections which are efficiently constructible, i.e., there exists a polynomial time algorithm that on input l, x ∈ {0, 1} k outputs ψ l (x).
Pseudorandom function families can be constructed from any pseudorandom generator [13] , which in turn could be constructed from any one-way function [22] . Alternatively, one could trust and use much simpler constructions based on AES or other widely available cryptographic functions.
In our protocols we make use also of distributed pseudorandom functions (DPRF), as introduced by Naor et al. [23] . In a DPRF the ability to evaluate the function is distributed among the servers, such that any authorized subset of the servers can evaluate the function, while no unauthorized subset gets any information about the function. For example, in a threshold DPRF the authorization to the evaluation of the functions is determined by the cardinality of the subset of the servers. In the sequel, we denote by Φ k = {ϕ l } l∈{0,1} k a family of efficiently constructible distributed pseudorandom functions. Moreover, we assume that if Φ k denotes a DPRF with threshold κ, and if every server holds a polynomial κ-out-n share r i of a seed r (where all r i 's are from the same domain as r) then ϕ r (x) can be efficiently computed from any set of κ values ϕ ri (x) for any position x ∈ {0, 1} k . Threshold DPRFs with this property are also called non-interactive. Nielsen [24] showed how to construct efficiently such non-interactive threshold DPRFs based on the decisional Diffie-Hellman assumption [25] .
Technical Roadmap
Hybrid Secret Sharing. A basic tool we need is a κ-out-n hybrid secret sharing scheme: it allows a dealer to share a secret value among all other servers, such that every server receives an additive n-out-n share of the secret, as well as a κ-out-n backup share of every other server's additive share (t + 1 ≤ κ ≤ n). Moreover, it guarantees to terminate for any server if the dealer is honest; otherwise, it either terminates for none or for all honest servers. Details of our scheme are given in Section 4. Reconstructible Proactive Pseudorandomness (PPR). The key to our solutions for proactive secret sharing and for joint random secret sharing is a reconstructible PPR scheme. Such a scheme provides at every phase τ to every server P i a secret value pr τ,i which looks completely random to the adversary. Furthermore, any set of n − t servers must be able to reconstruct the value pr τ,j of any other server P j without affecting the secrecy of the random value pr τ ,j computed by this server in another phase τ = τ .
Our implementation assumes a trusted dealer that provides in the first phase every server P i with a random key r i , and with a (n − t)-out-n backup share r ji of every other server's key r j . The idea is to compute pr τ,i as ϕ ri (c), where {ϕ l } is a DPRF with threshold (n − t), and c is some constant (pseudorandomness and constructibility of pr τ,i then follows by the properties of DPRFs). This approach requires the servers to refresh in every phase their keys r i (and shares r 1i , . . . , r ni ) such that the fresh keys of honest servers are unknown to the adversary. This can be done as follows.
In a first step, P i shares the pseudorandom value ψ ri (a) (where a denotes some public constant) among all other servers using a (n − t)-out-n hybrid secret sharing scheme, where it derives all random choices using its current key r i as a seed to a pseudorandom function. It then computes its new key r i as the sum of the additive shares provided by all these hybrid secret sharing schemes (the new shares r 1i , . . . , r ni are computed as the sum of all provided backup shares). To do this, P i waits until n − t servers have completed their sharing scheme as a dealer; for every other server P j , it reveals the share r ji . It can now simply wait until either P j 's sharing scheme terminates, or until it receives enough shares r jl from other servers P l to reconstruct r j and derive the missing shares thereof; since a sharing scheme terminates either for none or for all servers, one of the two cases eventually happens.
Notice that the servers need not agree on whether to derive the missing shares from the sharing schemes, or from the reconstructed key r j , as both ways provide the same values. Our protocol ensures that there is at least one honest server whose sharing scheme is not reconstructed. This ensures secrecy of the new keys r i . Proactive Secret Sharing (PSS). Suppose that at the beginning of the computation, a trusted dealer shares a secret s among the servers. To prevent a mobile adversary from learning s, the servers have to compute fresh shares of s whenever they enter a new phase. This can be done using a proactive secret sharing scheme.
Our implementation for PSS relies on an underlying PPR scheme (initialized by the dealer). Furthermore, it assumes that the trusted dealer initially provides every server with an additive share of the secret s, and with a (t + 1)-out-n backup share of every other server's additive share.
In an epoch τ , the servers refresh their shares of the secret by first re-sharing their additive share of s using a (t+1)-out-n hybrid sharing scheme; in this step, every server P i derives all its random choices by using the current random value pr τ,i (provided by the PPR scheme) as a seed to a pseudorandom function.
As in the PPR scheme, every server then computes its fresh additive share of s as the sum of the additive shares provided by all re-sharing protocols (the backup shares are computed analogously). It therefore waits for n − t re-sharing schemes to terminate, and reconstructs the remaining schemes in public. This can be done by reconstructing for every corresponding dealer P j the random value pr τ,j as well as P j 's current additive share of the secret. Reconstructing pr τ,j can be done using the reconstruction mechanism of the PPR scheme, whereas P j 's additive share can be reconstructed by revealing the corresponding backup shares. Joint Random Secret Sharing (JRSS). The goal of a JRSS protocol is to provide every server with a (t + 1)-out-n share of a random value e unknown by the adversary. It can be executed repeatedly during the phases. Our implementation works exactly as the above protocol for refreshing a sharing, except for the following differences. In an instance with tag ID of protocol JRSS, a server P i derives its random choices from the (pseudo)random value ϕ ri (ID) (as opposed to pr τ,i = ϕ ri (c)), where r i and {ϕ l } is the current key of P i and the DPRF, respectively, used by the underlying PPR scheme. It then shares a random value e i and proceeds as above. If the sharing scheme of a server P j needs to be reconstructed, the servers reconstruct only the corresponding randomness ϕ rj (ID). Adding up all backup shares provided by the sharing schemes yields the desired (t + 1)-out-n share of the random value e = e 1 + · · · + e n . Building Proactive Cryptosystems. Our protocols for PSS and for JRSS allow to build proactive versions of a large class of discrete logarithm-based cryptosystems without the use of expensive agreement sub-protocols. The idea is to share the key of the cryptosystem using our PSS protocol, and to accomplish the cryptographic operation using a distributed protocol. Such a protocol can be derived by combining our JRSS protocol with known techniques from threshold cryptography. We illustrate this idea in Section 8, considering Schnorr's signature scheme [17] as example.
Hybrid Secret Sharing
In this section, we describe the syntax and security properties of our protocol for hybrid secret sharing, HybridShare κ , which will serve as a basic tool in our subsequent constructions. A description and analysis of the protocol is given in [1] .
Intuitively, our hybrid secret sharing protocol allows a dealer to share a secret s among n servers in such a way that every server P i computes an additive share s i of the secret, and a κ-out-n backup share s ji of every other server's additive share, where t + 1 ≤ κ ≤ n (the idea of backing up additive shares is inspired by [26] ). Our specification treats the randomness r used by the dealer as an explicit parameter, and requires that the share of every server is a deterministic function of s and r. This constructibility of the shares will be essential for our purposes.
Formally, our sharing protocol HybridShare κ has the following syntax. Let F q be an arbitrary finite field, denoting the domain of secrets. There is a distinguished server P d called the dealer which activates an instance ID.d of HybridShare κ upon receiving an input of the form (ID.d, in, share, s, r) , where s ∈ F q and r ∈ {0, 1} k ; if this happens, we also say the dealer shares s over F q using randomness r through ID. 
Asynchronous Reconstructible Proactive Pseudorandomness
In this section we give a definition for an asynchronous reconstructible PPR scheme along the lines of [12] , and describe our implementation. The security proof of the scheme is contained in the full version of the paper.
Definition
Let l(k) be a fixed polynomial. An asynchronous reconstructible proactive pseudorandomness scheme consists of a probabilistic setup algorithm σ, a proactive pseudorandomness protocol π, and a reconstruction protocol ρ. An instance of such a scheme has an associated tag ID and works as follows.
The setup algorithm σ produces the initial state information state 0,i and the initial random value pr 0,i of every server P i . It is executed at the beginning of the computation by a trusted dealer. At the beginning of every phase τ ∈ [1, m(k)], the servers execute an instance ID|ppr.τ of π to compute a fresh pseudorandom value for phase τ . The input action for server P i carries the state information state τ −1,i of the previous phase, and has the form (ID|ppr.τ , in, state τ −1,i ). The output action comprises the pseudorandom value pr τ,i and the updated state information state τ,i . It has the form (ID|ppr.τ , out, pr τ,i , state τ,i ). If P i does not produce an output in phase τ (which could be the case if the server was corrupted and halted in the previous phase) then its input state τ,i to the subsequent instance of π is the empty input ⊥.
In every phase τ ∈ [1, m(k)], the servers may execute an instance ID|rec j .τ of protocol ρ to reconstruct the current pseudorandom value of server P j . The corresponding input and output actions have the form (ID|rec j .τ , in, state τ,i ), and (ID|rec j .τ , out, z i ), respectively, where state τ,i denotes the current state information of P i . We say a server reconstructs a value z i for P j , if it outputs a message (ID|rec j .τ , out, z i ).
As in [12] , we define the security requirements with respect to the following on-line attack: The scheme is run in the presence of a t-limited adversary for m(k) phases. At every phase τ , the adversary may also instruct the servers to reconstruct the value pr τ,i of any server. At a certain phase l (chosen adaptively by the adversary), the adversary chooses an honest server P j whose value pr τ,j is not reconstructed at that phase. She is then given a test value v, and the execution of the scheme is resumed for phases l + 1, . . . , m(k). (Our definition will require that the adversary is unable to say whether v is P j 's output at phase l, or a random value.)
For an instance ID of a PPR scheme and an adversary A, let A(ID, PR) denote the output of A after an on-line attack on ID, when v is indeed the output of P j ; similarly, let A(ID, R) denote the corresponding output when v is a random value. Definition 1. Let σ, π, and ρ be given as above. We call (σ, π, ρ) a t-resilient asynchronous reconstructible proactive pseudorandomness scheme if for every instance ID, and every t-limited adversary A the following properties hold: 
The message complexity of an instance of π is uniformly bounded.
Implementation
Let Φ k = {ϕ i } i∈{0,1} k denote a DPRF with threshold n − t, and a, b, c denote distinct arbitrary constants in the domain of Φ k . For convenience, we view elements from {0, 1} k as elements from F 2 k (and conversely), according to some fixed bijective map from {0, 1} k to F 2 k . All computations are done over F 2 k .
The Setup Algorithm σ ppr . The setup algorithm provides to every server P i a random value r i ∈ F 2 k , and a (t + 1)-out-n share r ji ∈ F 2 k of the random value of every other server. It therefore chooses n random polynomials
The initial state information of a server P i is defined as
The initial pseudorandom value is computed as pr 0,i ← ϕ fi(0) (c). The Reconstruction Protocol ρ ppr . Let r i , r 1i , . . . , r ni denote P i 's local input to an instance ID|rec j .τ of protocol ρ ppr . Reconstructing the pseudorandom value pr τ,j of server P j is straightforward. Every server P i computes pr τ,ji ← ϕ rji (c), and sends it to every other server. Using the reconstruction mechanism of Φ k , every server can compute pr τ,j upon receiving n − t "shares" pr τ,jm from other servers P m .
The Asynchronous Proactive Pseudorandomness Protocol π ppr . Let r i , r 1i , . . . , r ni denote server P i 's local input state τ −1,i to instance ID|ppr.τ of π ppr . To refresh this sharing, and to compute fresh pseudorandom values {pr τ,i }, every server P i executes the following transition rules in parallel. SHARE: When P i invokes the protocol with non-empty input, it shares the pseudorandom value ϕ ri (a) over F 2 k using randomness ϕ ri (b) through an instance ID|ppr.τ |share.i of protocol HybridShare n−t . SHARE-TERMINATION: Whenever P i terminates a sharing protocol ID|ppr.τ |share.j, it stores the corresponding output in the local variablesd ji ,d j1i , . . . ,d jni . If the (n − t)'th such sharing protocol has terminated and P i has received non-empty input before, it sends to all servers a reveal message containing the values ϕ rmi (a) and ϕ rmi (b) for servers P m whose sharing protocol did not terminate yet. RECONSTRUCT: Whenever P i receives n−t values ϕ rmi (a), ϕ rmi (b) for a server P m , it reconstructs ϕ rm (a) and ϕ rm (b) using the reconstruction mechanism of Φ k . It then computes the valuesd mi ,d m1i , . . . ,d mni as the i'th share when sharing a secret ϕ rm (a) using randomness ϕ rm (b) according to protocol HybridShare n−t . COMBINE: When P i has computed valuesd ji ,d j1i , . . . ,d jni for every j ∈ [1, n], it computes its local output values pr τ,i and state τ,i (r i , r 1i , . . . , r ni ) as r i ← n j=1d ji , r mi ← n j=1d jmi for m ∈ [1, n], and pr τ,i ← ϕ r i (c). The scheme guarantees pseudorandomness because the pseudorandom values ϕ r h (a) and ϕ r h (b) of at least one honest server remain hidden from the adversary. This is guaranteed because all honest servers together reveal at most (n − t)t "shares" ϕ rij (a) and ϕ rij (b). But to reconstruct ϕ ri (a) and ϕ ri (b) of all (n − t) honest servers, the adversary needs at least (n − t)(n − 2t) ≥ (n − t)(t + 1) such shares, as the threshold of Ψ k is (n − t).
The reason why the scheme avoids an agreement (while preserving constructibility) is the following: if an honest server P i terminates the protocol ID|ppr.τ |share.j and computes the tuple (d ji ,d j1i , . . . ,d jni ), then this is the same tuple it would compute by first reconstructing the randomness r j of P j from backup shares, and then reproducing the computations of P j in the sharing protocol ID|ppr.τ |share.j. Hence, the servers do not have to agree whether to compute their share of P j 's sharing protocol by the SHARE-TERMINATION or the RECONSTRUCT transition rule, respectively, as both rules provide the same share. We prove the following theorem in [1] . 
Refreshing a Sharing
In this section we define an asynchronous PSS scheme along the lines of [9] , and sketch our implementation. The security proof of the scheme can be found in [1] .
Definition
Let K denote the domain of possible secrets, S denote the domain of possible shares, and l(k) a fixed polynomial. An asynchronous proactive secret sharing scheme consists of a setup algorithm σ, a proactive refresh protocol π, and a reconstruction protocol ρ. An instance of a PSS has a tag ID and works as follows. The setup algorithm produces for each server P i the initial state information state 0,i and the initial share s 0,i ∈ S of the secret. It is executed at the beginning of the computation by the trusted dealer. At the beginning of every phase τ ∈ [1, m(k)] the servers execute an instance ID|ref.τ of protocol π to refresh the old share s τ −1,i , and to update the state state τ −1,i . The corresponding input and output actions of server P i have the form (ID|ref.τ , in, s τ −1,i , state τ −1,i ) and (ID|ref.τ , out, s τ,i , state τ,i ) , respectively, where s τ −1,i and state τ −1,i equal ⊥ in case P i did not produce an output in phase τ − 1.
In every phase τ ∈ [1, m(k)], the servers may execute an instance ID|rec.τ of protocol ρ to reconstruct the secret. The input and output actions for server P i have the form (ID|rec.τ, in, s τ,i ) , and (ID|rec.τ, out, z i ), respectively, where s τ,i denotes the current share as computed by the instance ID|ref.τ . We say that a server reconstructs a value z i , when it outputs a message (ID|rec.τ, out, z i ).
Definition 2. Let σ, π, and ρ be given as above. We call (σ, π, ρ) a t-resilient asynchronous proactive secret sharing scheme, if for every instance ID, and every t-limited adversary the following properties hold: honest server reconstructs a value z i , then z i = s. PRIVACY: As long as no honest server activates an instance of ρ, the adversary cannot guess s with probability significantly better than 1/|K|. EFFICIENCY: The message complexity of π and ρ is uniformly bounded.
We stress that the security of the sharing does not depend on the timely delivery of messages. Even if the adversary fails to deliver the messages within prescribed phase, the privacy of the shared secret is not compromised.
Implementation
Our implementation of the PSS scheme is a suitable example to illustrate how the PPR scheme introduced in the previous section can be used to avoid the need for agreement even if it seems to be inherently necessary. We therefore briefly recall the standard solution [9] for PSS that depends on agreement. Here, every server initially receives a (t + 1)-out-n share of the secret. To refresh the shares, every server provides every other server with a (t + 1)-out-n sub-share of its own share, using a suitable sharing scheme. The servers then agree on a set of at least t+1 servers whose re-sharing scheme terminates for all honest servers, and compute the new share as the linear combination of the received sub-shares (with Lagrange coefficients).
We follow the same approach (see Section 3), but avoid agreement by reconstructing the re-sharing schemes of the slowest (possibly crashed) servers in public. However, this approach only works if the publicly reconstructed sub-shares are identical to the ones which the re-sharing scheme would produce. Otherwise, the servers would again have to agree on which sub-shares to reconstruct, and which to take from the re-sharing schemes. This is where the PPR scheme comes in handy, as it allows to reconstruct the random choices made by a server when it is re-sharing its share. The technical details are given below. Let the domain of possible secrets be a field F q where q ≤ 2 k . All computations are in F q or F 2 k , as is clear from the context. , s 1i , . . . , s ni ) , where s i = f i (0) and s ji = f j (i).
The Setup Algorithm
Additionally, the setup algorithm provides every server with the initial state information needed to initialize a PPR scheme. It therefore runs the setup algorithm σ ppr , and computes the initial state information state 0,i of server P i as the tuple (state . Furthermore, if P i received non-empty input, it shares its share s i over F q using randomness pr τ −1,i through an instance ID|ref.τ |share.i of protocol HybridShare t+1 . SHARE-TERMINATION: Whenever P i terminates an instance ID|ref.τ |share.j of a sharing protocol , it stores the corresponding output in the local variablesē ji , e j1i , . . . ,ē jni . If for n − t servers P j the corresponding protocols ID|ref.τ |share.j have terminated, it sends the indices of all servers whose sharing protocol did not terminate yet to every other server in a missing message. REVEAL: If for some index m, P i receives (n−t) missing messages from other servers containing this index and has received non-empty input before, it sends a reveal message to every other server containing the backup share s mi and the index m. Next, it activates the instance ID|rec m .τ of protocol ρ ppr with input state ppr τ −1,i to reconstruct the randomness pr τ −1,m of P m . RECONSTRUCT: Whenever P i receives (t + 1) reveal messages for the same index m and reconstructs the value pr τ −1,m for P m , it computes the share s m from the received backup shares by Lagrange interpolation. It then computes the tuple (ē mi , e m1i , . . . ,ē mni ) as the i'th share when sharing s m using randomness pr τ −1,m . COMBINE: When P i has computed values (ē mi ,ē m1i , . . . ,ē mni ) for all m ∈ [1, n], it computes the new share (s i , s 1i , . . . , s ni ) as follows:
Notice that the protocol has the same message flow as the pseudorandomness protocol π ppr , except for the additional missing messages. They ensure the secrecy of the share s h of at least one honest server P h , and are needed because the servers hold a (t + 1)-out-n hybrid sharing of the secret s. We remark that for refreshing a (n − t)-out-n hybrid sharing, the servers could omit waiting for t + 1 such messages, and could execute the REVEAL rule directly at the end of the SHARE-TERMINATION rule. This would save one communication round. The proof of the following theorem can be found in [1] . 
Asynchronous Proactive Joint Random Secret Sharing
The goal of an asynchronous proactive joint random secret sharing scheme is to enable the servers to repeatedly generate (t + 1)-out-n sharings of random values, such that the random values remain hidden from the adversary. Due to lack of space, we only sketch the definition and implementation.
Definition. An asynchronous proactive joint random secret sharing (JRSS) scheme consists of a setup algorithm σ, a proactive update protocol π, a joint random secret sharing protocol γ, and a reconstruction protocol ρ. An instance of such a scheme has a tag ID and works as follows.
At the beginning of the computation, a trusted dealer executes the setup algorithm σ and provides every server with its initial state information state 0,i . At the beginning of every phase τ ∈ [1, m(k)], the servers execute protocol π to update the state information {state τ −1,i }. During every phase τ ∈ [1, m(k)], the servers can repeatedly execute protocol γ to generate a sharing of a random value z c in a domain K. Every such instance has a unique tag ID|gen c . For every server P i , it takes the current state information state τ,i as input, and produces as output a share s c,i of the random value z c . These shares may serve as input to the reconstruction protocol ρ with tag ID|rec c , which produces for every server P i a value z c,i as output.
For a JRSS scheme to be secure, we require that when the first server completes an instance ID|gen c , there is a fixed value z c such that the following holds: (Correctness) If a server P i terminates ID|rec c and outputs z c,i , then z c,i = z c . Furthermore, (Privacy) as long as no honest server activates ID|rec c , the adversary cannot guess z c with probability significantly better than 1/|K|. Implementation. Our implementation builds on our PPR scheme (σ ppr , π ppr , ρ ppr ). Let Φ k = {ϕ i } denote the DPRF family used by the PPR scheme, a and b denote two distinct constants, and H : {0, 1} * → {0, 1} k denote a collision resistant hash function (it is well-known how to construct such functions from standard computational assumptions such as the hardness of the discrete-logarithm problem).
The state information {state τ,i } of our JRSS scheme comprises only the state information of our PPR scheme, i.e., state τ,i (r i , r 1i , . . . , r ni ). Protocols σ jrss and π jrss for setting up and refreshing this state, respectively, consist only of calling the protocols σ ppr and π ppr . The protocol γ jrss for generating sharings of random values in {0, 1} k works as follows. Given input state τ,i (r i , r 1i , . . . , r ni ) to an instance ID|gen c of γ jrss , every server P i performs the following steps (all computations are done in F 2 k ). SHARE: When P i invokes the protocol with non-empty input, it shares ϕ ri (H(ID|gen c |a)) over F 2 k through an instance of protocol HybridShare t+1 with tag ID|gen c |share.i using randomness ϕ ri (H (ID|gen c |b) ). SHARE-TERMINATION: Whenever P i terminates a sharing protocol ID|gen c |share.j, it stores the corresponding output in local variablesē ji ,ē j1i , . . . ,ē jni . Once n − t sharing protocols have terminated and P i has received non-empty input before, it sends to all servers a reveal message containing values ϕ rmi (H(ID|gen c |a)) and ϕ rmi (H(ID|gen c |b)) for servers P m whose sharing protocol did not terminate yet. RECONSTRUCT: Upon receiving n−t reveal messages for the same index m, P i reconstructs values ϕ rm (H(ID|gen c |a)) and ϕ rm (H(ID|gen c |b)) (using the threshold evaluation property of Φ k ) and derives the missing sub-shareē mi ,ē m1i , . . . ,ē mni . COMBINE: When P i has computed values (ē mi ,ē m1i , . . . ,ē mni ) for every m ∈ [1, n], it computes s c,i (s i , s 1i , . . . , s ni ) as follows:
The shared secret value z c is never reconstructed but equals 
A Simple Proactive Secure Signature Scheme
Our protocols for PSS and JRSS can be used to proactivize a large class of discretelogarithm based public-key cryptosystems for signing and encryption. In this section, we sketch how this can be done considering Schnorr's signature scheme as an example.
Let p denote a large prime, and g denote a multiplicative subgroup of Z * p of prime order q such that q|p − 1. In the regular centralized Schnorr signature scheme, the secret key x of the signer is a random element from Z q , and the public key is y = g x . To sign a message m ∈ {0, 1} * , the signer picks a random number r ∈ Z q , and computes the signature (ρ, σ) as ρ ← g r mod p and σ ← r + H(m||ρ)x mod q. A signature (ρ, σ) on a message m can then be verified by checking that g σ = ρy H(m||ρ) mod p. In a proactive signature scheme, the power to sign a message is distributed among the servers such that in every epoch, only a set of at least t+1 servers can generate valid signatures, whereas any smaller set can neither compute a signature nor prevent the overall system from operating correctly. For a formal treatment of proactive signature schemes we refer to [12] . Proactivizing Schnorr's signature scheme in the above sense can be done as follows. First, a trusted dealer chooses the values p, q, g, x as in the standard Schnorr scheme, and initializes a PSS scheme with a sharing of x. It also initializes a JRSS scheme, and announces the public parameters p, q, g and y. To compute a signature (ρ, σ) on a message m, every server i performs the following steps: generate ρ = g r : (1) Use the underlying JRSS scheme to compute a (t+1)-out-n share r i of a random value r ∈ Z q . (2) Reveal the value ρ i = g ri mod p to all other servers. (3) Upon receiving t+1 values ρ j , compute ρ from the values ρ j by using Lagrange interpolation in the exponent, i.e., ρ ← i∈Q ρ λj j mod p. Here, Q denotes the indices of the received values ρ i , and λ i the Lagrange interpolation coefficient for the set Q and position 0. generate σ = r + H(m||ρ)x:
(1) Reveal the value σ i = r i + H(m||ρ)x i mod q to all other servers; here, x i denotes server i's current share of x as computed by the underlying PSS scheme.
(2) Upon receiving t + 1 values σ j , compute σ by using Lagrange interpolation, i.e., σ ← j∈S λ j σ j mod q. Here, S denotes the indices of the received values σ j , and λ j the Lagrange coefficients for the set S and position 0.
Verification of the computed signature can be done exactly as in the centralized Schnorr scheme. One can show that this proactive signature scheme is as secure as the centralized Schnorr scheme in the following sense: If there exists a t-limited mobile adversary against the proactive signature scheme that can forge a signature (under an adaptively chosen message attack), then there exists an adversary against the centralized Schnorr scheme that can forge signatures (under an adaptively chosen message attack).
Proactivizing other discrete-logarithm signature schemes such as ElGamal [15] or DSS [16] can be done in a similar way (to solve the inversion problem that occurs in DSS, one can use the approach of [27] ).
Conclusions and Open Problems
In this paper, we have presented the first asynchronous schemes for proactive secret sharing and proactive joint random secret sharing with a bounded worst case complexity. Moreover, our solutions run three times faster (in terms of latency) than the best known previous solutions.
The technical novelty of our schemes is that they do not rely on an agreement subprotocol. The fact that agreement can be avoided is surprising on its own, as all known previous techniques for implementing such schemes require the servers to have at some point a common view of which servers have been crashed.
A natural open problem is to enhance our techniques to tolerate a Byzantine adversary. Here, the main difficulty lies in designing a verifiable version of our hybrid secret sharing scheme. In such a scheme, the dealer must be committed to a random value (of the same size as the secret), such that every server can verify that the dealer has indeed computed the shares by using this random value as a seed to a pseudorandom function. In principle, this can be done using the technique of general zero-knowledge proofs [10] . We suggest it as an open research problem to construct a pseudorandom function together with efficient zero-knowledge proofs for this task.
